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The debate over whether mediators should “evaluate” revolves
around the confusion over what constitutes evaluation and an
“evaluative” mediator. The following examples describe two situa-
tions in which the mediators operate in an evaluative capacity.
During the course of an employment termination dispute, Eric
Green1 “tells both sides privately that, in his opinion, $600,000 . . . is
the settlement value of the case.”2 Green pushes the employer to-
wards settlement by saying, “It was your corporation’s responsibility
                                                                                                                   
* Professor of Clinical Law, Director of the Mediation Clinic and the Kukin Pro-
gram for Conflict Resolution, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. B.A., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1973; M.Ed., Virginia Commonwealth University, 1975; J.D., Georgetown University,
1979. The author thanks: Kimberlee Kovach, for her partnership in writing about these
ideas in an earlier article; Joseph Stulberg, for his partnership in exploring the evalua-
tive-facilitative debate in the context of advanced mediator training programs; Baruch
Bush, for his insightful dialogue on the subject; and Len Riskin, for raising the issue in
the first place. The author acknowledges and deeply appreciates Rebecca Martin, Abigail
Sloane, Roger Brach, and Dan Weitz for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article.
1. Eric Green founded Endispute, a dispute resolution consulting firm. He is a pro-
fessor at Boston University Law School and the co-author of STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985), the first dispute resolution textbook for law students.
The use of this example is not to criticize Professor Green’s performance; he is a highly
successful and respected neutral intervener. Rather, this Article argues that in this ex-
ample, Professor Green is combining mediation with neutral evaluation to create a “mixed
process.”
2. Lavinia Hall, Eric Green: Finding Alternatives to Litigation in Business Disputes,
in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 279, 295 (Deborah M. Kolb et al. eds.,
1994).
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to live up to its moral obligations.”3 When the former employee re-
sists the $600,000 figure, Green’s responds, “How greedy can you
get?”4 In the second example, during a divorce mediation, the hus-
band appears friendly and gregarious while the wife is calm and
poised, but somewhat cool.5 The mediator repeatedly favors the hus-
band in a manner indicating that she enforces the groundrules.6
When the wife mentions her debilitating health problems, the me-
diator laughs and says, “You don’t have to act sick to get what you
want.”7
In the first example, Green evaluates by assessing a fair settle-
ment value of the case and pressing the parties to accept that set-
tlement value. In the second example, the mediator evaluates by
making and articulating a judgment that the party is acting sick as a
ploy to advance her position.
An “evaluative” mediator gives advice, makes assessments, states
opinions—including opinions on the likely court outcome, proposes a
fair or workable resolution to an issue or the dispute, or presses the
parties to accept a particular resolution.8 The ten reasons that follow
demonstrate that those activities are inconsistent with the role of a
mediator.
I.   THE ROLES AND RELATED TASKS OF EVALUATORS AND
FACILITATORS ARE AT ODDS
Evaluating, assessing, and deciding for others is radically differ-
ent than helping others evaluate, assess, and decide for themselves.
Judges, arbitrators, neutral experts, and advisors are evaluators.
Their role is to make decisions and give opinions. To do so, they use
predetermined criteria to evaluate evidence and arguments pre-
sented by adverse parties. The tasks of evaluators include: finding
“the facts” by properly weighing evidence; judging credibility and
allocating the burden of proof; determining and applying the rele-
vant law, rule, or custom to the particular situation; and making an
award or rendering an opinion. The adverse parties have expressly
asked the evaluator—judge, arbitrator, or expert—to decide the is-
sue or resolve the conflict.
                                                                                                                   
3. Id. at 298-99.
4. Id. at 299.
5. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1586 (1991).
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 27-28 (1996) (de-
scribing the mediator techniques associated with evaluative mediation as proposing a set-
tlement, pushing parties to accept a settlement, predicting court or other outcomes, and
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case).
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In contrast, the role of mediators is to assist disputing parties in
making their own decisions and evaluating their own situations. A
mediator “facilitate[s] communications, promotes understanding, fo-
cuses the parties on their interests, and seeks creative problem
solving to enable the parties to reach their own agreement.”9 Media-
tors push disputing parties to question their assumptions, reconsider
their positions, and listen to each other’s perspectives, stories, and
arguments. They urge the parties to consider relevant law, weigh
their own values, principles, and priorities, and develop an optimal
outcome. In so doing, mediators facilitate evaluation by the parties.
These differences between evaluators and facilitators mean that
each uses different skills and techniques, and each requires different
competencies, training norms, and ethical guidelines to perform
their respective functions. Further, the evaluative tasks of deter-
mining facts, applying law or custom, and delivering an opinion not
only divert the mediator away from facilitation, but also can com-
promise the mediator’s neutrality—both in actuality and in the eyes
of the parties—because the mediator will be favoring one side in his
or her judgment.10
Endeavors are more likely to succeed when the goal is clear and
simple and not at war with other objectives.11 Any task, whether it is
the performance of an Olympic athlete, the advocacy of an attorney,
or the negotiation assistance provided by a mediator, requires a clear
and bright focus and the development of appropriate strategies,
skills, and power. In most cases, should the athlete or the attorney or
the mediator divert their focus to another task, it will diminish their
capacity to achieve their primary goal. “No one can serve two mas-
ters.”12 Mediators cannot effectively facilitate when they are evalu-
ating.13
                                                                                                                   
9. John Feerick et al., Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 95 app. at 123.
10. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymo-
ron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31 (1996); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator’s Role and
Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 265 (1989) (describing the impor-
tance of complete mediator impartiality). But see Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox:
The Highwire Act of Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62, 62 (1996)
(noting that while the primary risk of evaluation is the mediator’s potential loss of per-
ceived neutrality because the “loser” in the evaluation may view the mediator as an ad-
versary, nonetheless, situations do exist in which the careful and thoughtful use of media-
tor evaluation can serve the parties).
11. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 32.
12. Matthew 6:24.
13. As seen in Professor Green’s performance, there are examples in the mediation
literature of “mediators” who evaluate. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4. When me-
diators evaluate, they assume additional roles and potentially jeopardize their effective-
ness as a mediator. However, “mixed processes,” in which the mediator assumes different
roles, can be useful. See discussion infra Part X.
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II.   EVALUATION PROMOTES POSITIONING AND POLARIZATION, WHICH
ARE ANTITHETICAL TO THE GOALS OF MEDIATION14
When disputing parties are in the presence of an evaluator—a
judge, an arbitrator, or a neutral expert—they act (or should act) dif-
ferently than they would in the presence of a mediator. With an
evaluator, disputants make themselves look as good as possible and
their opponent as bad as possible. They do not make offers of com-
promise or reveal their hand for fear that it weakens the evaluator’s
perception of the strength of their case.15 They are in a competitive
mind-set seeking to capture the evaluator’s favor and win the case.
While adversarial confrontations between parties are helpful to a
neutral who must judge credibility and clarify the choices he or she
must make, such confrontations are not helpful to collaboration. Ad-
versarial behaviors run counter to the mediator’s efforts to move par-
ties towards a different perception of their own situation and of each
other.16 While parties typically enter the mediation process in a hos-
tile and adversarial stance, the mediator seeks to shift them towards
a collaborative posture in which they jointly construct a win-win so-
lution. An atmosphere of respectful collaboration is a necessary
foundation for creative problem-solving.17
III.   ETHICAL CODES CAUTION MEDIATORS—AND OTHER NEUTRALS—
AGAINST ASSUMING ADDITIONAL ROLES
The ethical codes explicitly include a preference to keep processes
“pure.” The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators highlight
party self-determination as being the fundamental principle of me-
diation.18 The committee that created the Model Standards rejected
                                                                                                                   
14. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 31 (noting that evaluation tends to perpetu-
ate or create an adversarial climate and discourage understanding and problem-solving).
15. See Riskin, supra note 8, at 45 (noting that mediator evaluation can be a disin-
centive for the parties’ candor). Federal Rule of Evidence 408 renders evidence of conduct
or statements made in compromise negotiations inadmissible at trial to prove liability for
or validity of a claim. See FED. R. EVID. 408. This rule encourages free participation in set-
tlement discussions and highlights the assumption that negotiators will not speak openly
and candidly if their remarks are or will be heard by someone who will subsequently
evaluate their case. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
16. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994)
(articulating and expounding the mediator goal of supporting parties’ efforts to move to-
wards empowerment and recognition).
17. The technique of “brainstorming,” designed to maximize the development of crea-
tive options, precludes evaluation of ideas during the idea-generating process as detrimen-
tal to creativity. Parties should separate the processes of inventing solutions and deciding
outcomes. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 62-67 (1981).
18. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I (Am. Arb. Ass’n
et al. 1995) (“A Mediator shall Recognize that Mediation is Based on the Principle of Self-
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mediation as an evaluative process.19 The comments to the Model
Standards state that “[a] mediator should . . . refrain from providing
professional advice. Where appropriate, a mediator should recom-
mend that parties seek outside professional advice, or consider re-
solving their dispute through arbitration, counseling, neutral
evaluation, or other processes.”20
Similarly, ethical codes for arbitrators encourage those neutrals
not to participate in settlement discussions unless requested to do so
by all parties.21 Important rationales for this rule are: the arbitrator
may be improperly influenced by the settlement discussions; the ar-
bitrator may impede the discussions by his or her presence; and the
arbitrator’s questions and suggestions while acting as a mediator
can create improper pressure to settle.
Consequently, a mediator undertaking to give an opinion on the
likely court outcome of a particular claim or a fair resolution of a
particular matter should give an accurate label of the new role he or
she is assuming22 and obtain the disputants’ informed consent for
undertaking the new role. Also, the mediator should be sure that the
disputants understand that taking on an additional role might ad-
versely impact the ability to facilitate discussions. When processes
become “mixed,” such as when an arbitrator mediates or a mediator
evaluates, it should be at the request and with the informed consent
of the parties.
IV.   IF MEDIATORS EVALUATE LEGAL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, THEY
MUST BE LAWYERS; ELIMINATING NONLAWYERS WILL WEAKEN THE
FIELD
If it is acceptable or customary for mediators to give opinions on
likely court outcomes or the merits of particular legal claims or de-
fenses, then only lawyers and substantive experts will be competent
to mediate.23 The comments to the Model Standards state that a
                                                                                                                   
Determination by the Parties.”) The Model Standards were approved by the American Ar-
bitration Association (AAA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the Society of Pro-
fessionals in Dispute Resolution.
19. John Feerick, chairman of the committee that drafted the Model Standards,
noted that “[w]e as a group did not buy into mediation as an evaluative process . . . .”
Feerick et al., supra note 9, at 103.
20. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI cmt. (1995).
21. See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon IV.H
(1977) (approved by the AAA and ABA). “[A]n arbitrator should not be present or other-
wise participate in the settlement discussions unless requested to do so by all parties. An
arbitrator should not exert pressure on any party to settle.” Id.
22. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 31 (stating that the Model Standards re-
quire a mediator who engages in other processes to inform the parties).
23. See Riskin, supra note 8, at 46 (noting that the need for subject-matter expertise
typically increases in direct proportion to the parties’ need for mediator evaluation);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
942 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:937
“mediator who undertakes, at the request of the parties, an addi-
tional dispute resolution role in the same matter assumes increased
responsibilities and obligations that may be governed by the stan-
dards of other processes.”24
While this result may be good news for lawyers, the mediator pool
would be substantially weakened by the loss of the talents and per-
spectives of nonlawyers.25 Furthermore, if the field is theirs, lawyer-
mediators will likely pull mediation into an adversarial paradigm.26
One noted authority in the mediation field, reacting to a Florida rule
requiring mediators of certain cases to be either experienced lawyers
or retired judges, proclaimed this requirement to be “the end of good
mediation.”27
V.   THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST INCORRECT
MEDIATOR EVALUATIONS
Even assuming that mediators could be governed by and held to
appropriate standards when they evaluate, growing concerns about
the quality of justice that disputants receive when they are diverted
from courts into private alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proc-
esses28 argue for leaving evaluation to adversarial processes where
due process protections are in place. In the courts, disputants can
appeal decisions they feel are wrong. In arbitration, disputants pick
arbitrators based on the arbitrator’s substantive expertise or wisdom
and consciously waive the right to appeal.
In mediation, little protection exists from a mediator’s inade-
quately informed opinion. Confidentiality statutes, rules, and
agreements keep sessions private.29 Quasi-judicial immunity in some
                                                                                                                   
COST LITIG. 57, 61 (1996) (asserting that giving legal predictions and evaluations is the
practice of law and cautioning nonlawyer-mediators to be wary of evaluative mediation).
24. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI cmt. (1995).
25. See Paul J. Spiegelman, Certifying Mediators: Using Selection Criteria to Include
the Qualified—Lessons from the San Diego Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 677, 693-97
(1996) (describing the critical role that nonlawyers and nonadversarial thinking have
played in the development of mediation).
26. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
“Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 50 (1991) (raising concerns regarding the
transformation of mediation from a consensual to a coercive process); Kovach & Love, su-
pra note 10, at 31-32 (discussing a variety of ways in which courts and lawyers tend to
pull mediation towards an adversarial framework).
27. Alfini, supra note 26, at 47 (quoting Albie Davis’s comment that increasing the
use of evaluative mediation approaches portends the end of “good mediation”).
28. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice
Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 82-83 (1996) (raising concerns about the quality of
justice unrepresented litigants receive when they come to court but are diverted into me-
diation).
29. See Confidentiality in Court-ADR Programs, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 173, 175 (1992) (discussing the various protections afforded the mediation process).
But see Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising
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cases can shield mediators from liability for careless opinions.30 The
mediator’s opinion that one of the parties should buy a carpet to
lessen the impact of sounds heard by a neighbor or that one of the
parties does not have standing to bring a particular claim in court
carries enormous weight.31 Mediators are not in the best position to
make those sorts of evaluations because, if they are doing their fa-
cilitative job, they have not completed the necessary preliminary
tasks of an evaluator. Additionally, unless a mediator has separate
training as a judge, arbitrator, or neutral evaluator, he or she may
not be competent to serve as an evaluator. Service as a mediator
does not qualify a mediator to be a judge any more than service as a
judge qualifies a judge to mediate.
VI.   EVALUATION ABOUNDS: THE DISPUTING WORLD NEEDS
ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS
The processes of litigation, “rent-a-judge,”32 arbitration,33 early
neutral evaluation,34 and summary jury trial35 are all available for
parties who want opinions or decisions. Evaluative models and service
providers abound. We need a genuine alternative to the adversarial
paradigm of disputants who fight and a neutral who assesses.
The collaborative paradigm of mediation, in which mediator
evaluation does not play a part, offers a dispute resolution process
                                                                                                                   
from the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (arguing that even a
strict confidentiality statute should not preclude parties’ ability to obtain information
relevant to mediator malpractice).
30. See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (extending quasi-
judicial immunity to case evaluators in the mediation program of the District of Columbia
Superior Court).
31. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 61 (noting that parties may rely on what
mediators tell them).
32. “Rent-a-judge” or private judging is a dispute resolution process in which adver-
sarial presentations are made to a party-selected neutral decisionmaker who renders a
decision that is typically binding and subject to the usual appeals process through the
courts. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 280-81.
33. Arbitration is a private, voluntary dispute resolution process in which the parties
to a dispute agree in writing to submit the dispute for resolution to a third-party neutral,
chosen pursuant to the agreement of the parties. See Michele L. Giovagnoli, To Be or Not
to Be?: Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena,
64 UMKC L. REV. 547, 554-55 (1996). The parties make adversarial presentations to the
third-party neutral, and the neutral determines the facts and makes an award. See id. at
555. The arbitrator’s award is usually binding and not subject to appeal, but may be advi-
sory, depending on the parties’ agreement. See id.
34. Early neutral evaluation is a private dispute resolution process in which a neu-
tral with subject-matter expertise provides the parties with a nonbinding, reasoned
evaluation of their cases to assist settlement. See J. Daniel Breen, Mediation and the
Magistrate Judge, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1007, 1019-20 (1996).
35. A summary jury trial is a court-ordered dispute resolution process in which at-
torneys give brief presentations of their cases to a jury whose nonbinding verdict assists
the parties in settling the case. See Frank Evans & Shadow Sloane, Resolving Employ-
ment Disputes Through ADR Process, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 745, 762-63 (1996).
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through which parties are taught how to resolve their own disputes,
listen to each other differently, broaden their own capacities for un-
derstanding and collaboration, and create resolutions that build re-
lationships, generate more harmony, and are “win-win.”36 The lesson,
“Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, teach him to fish and
you feed him for a lifetime,” highlights the importance of teaching
people how to solve their own dilemmas.
In the corporate world, phalanges of consultants assist in pro-
moting creative problem-solving and building teams capable of suc-
cessful collaboration. Similarly, the legal community needs a model
from among the array of dispute resolution processes that will assist
parties to evolve in their understandings, relationships, and ar-
rangements, using the opportunity represented by conflict situa-
tions.
Mediation has the potential of being shifted towards an adver-
sarial framework in which mediators “trash and bash”37 to get par-
ties to settle. They “trash” the parties’ cases, predicting loss and
risk if litigation is pursued.38 They “bash” settlement proposals
that the other side will not accept.39 We lose a great deal if media-
tion becomes a mere adjunct of the adversarial norm. Having media-
tors use evaluation as a technique to get movement takes us in that
direction.
VII.   MEDIATOR EVALUATION DETRACTS FROM THE FOCUS ON PARTY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRITICAL EVALUATION, RE-EVALUATION AND
CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING
If Einstein’s insight is true that “[t]he significant problems we
face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at
when we created them,”40 then we, as a society, are called on to nur-
ture ways to achieve higher levels of thinking and creativity. Media-
tion is the one dispute resolution process in which the neutral’s role
                                                                                                                   
36. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing mediation’s distinctive role);
Bush, supra note 10, at 267-70 (highlighting mediation’s unique capacity for
empowerment and recognition).
37. Alfini, supra note 26, at 66-73. Professor Alfini characterizes Florida circuit court
mediation, which is conducted by legal professionals, as “trashing,” “bashing,” and “hash-
ing it out.” Id. at 66. “Trashers” tell parties how bad their case is to get each side to be
more realistic. Effective trashers have litigation experience that lends to their “trashing”
credibility. See id. at 66-68. “Bashers” focus on settlement offers and bash away at the of-
fers, trying to get a midrange number. Most bashers are retired judges who use their
prestige to “hammer sense” into parties. See id. at 68-71. “Hashers” are similar to facilita-
tive mediators. See id. at 71-73.
38. See id. at 66.
39. See id. at 69.
40. Marc S. Klein, Reframing the ‘Tort Reform’ Debate (and Our Participation in It),
N.J. LAW., Jan. 1995, at 39 (quoting Albert Einstein).
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is to assist the parties to collaborate creatively and resolve the issues
they face.41
Frequently, for the individuals, communities, or institutions in-
volved, conflicts represent true crises, holding the potential for doing
extreme harm and, at the same time, holding the potential for crea-
tive change and restructuring. The mediator’s task of elevating the
dialogue from recriminations and blame to the generation of possi-
bilities and breakthrough ideas is a task we are just beginning to
understand. If we allow mediation and mediators to slip into the
comfortable (because it is the norm) adversarial mind-set of evalua-
tion, we kill the turbo-thrust of the jet engine of idea generation.42
So-called “evaluative mediation” pulls mediation away from creativ-
ity and into the adversarial frame.43 If we are to continue to survive
and evolve as a species, we need to nurture the processes that tap
our affinity to create and imagine.44
VIII.   EVALUATION CAN STOP NEGOTIATION
When mediators provide opinions, the opinions have conse-
quences. An unfavorable opinion can seriously disadvantage one of
the parties. When a party disagrees with the unfavorable opinion,
the party is likely to withdraw from the mediation, believing that the
mediator has “sided” with the other party. On the other hand, a
party advantaged by a favorable opinion may get locked into an un-
acceptable claim or position and negotiations may stop altogether.45
Because mediators are charged with furthering negotiation, this re-
sult is undesirable.
The following incident illustrates this problem. The general coun-
sel of a large shipping company was called to a mediation session in
Florida.46 The mediation involved a multi-million dollar dispute with
                                                                                                                   
41. I am arguing for a clear articulation of the mediator’s role. See Bush, supra note
10, at 256 (stressing the importance of a governing conception of the mediator’s role that
articulates mediator qualifications and standards for practice). However, many different
visions of the mediator’s role exist. See, e.g., Alfini, supra note 26, at 73-74 (summarizing
a variety of mediation styles and concluding that a lack of consensus exists as to what
constitutes “good mediation”); Bush, supra note 10, at 258 (describing three different con-
ceptions of the mediator’s role: efficiency, protection-of-rights, and “empowerment-and-
recognition”); Riskin, supra note 8, at 23-34 (describing different mediator orientations
based on evaluative-facilitative and narrow-issue-definition/broad-issue-definition con-
tinuums).
42. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 32 (stating that “evaluative mediation”
shifts mediation into the framework of the adversarial norm and thereby stifles parties’
creative capacity to resolve their own disputes).
43. See id.
44. See JOHN LENNON, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971) (suggesting the
possibilities available).
45. See Riskin, supra note 8, at 28 n.67 (noting that assessments can impair a party’s
faith in the mediator’s neutrality or restrict a party’s flexibility).
46. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 31 (describing this incident in more detail).
946 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:937
a union, and the general counsel went to Florida wanting to settle
the matter.47 During the mediation, in a joint session, the mediator
urged the company to be more flexible because the business did not
have a chance of winning on appeal .48 That evaluation shut down the
negotiations by freezing the union representatives into their posi-
tion.49 Several years and hundreds of thousands of dollars later, the
company won a complete victory in court that was affirmed on ap-
peal.50 Mediator behavior should not cause such pyrrhic (lose-lose)
victories.
Of course, when one side has an unrealistic assessment of its
case, a different impediment to negotiation is present. In such cases,
mediators should encourage re-evaluation by enabling each side to
present its best case and strongest arguments to the other side, en-
couraging the parties to get professional advice, questioning conclu-
sions of the parties, and urging a neutral evaluation to break a
stalemate.51
IX.   A UNIFORM UNDERSTANDING OF MEDIATION IS CRITICAL TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIELD52
A recently completed two-year-long study and report on court-
referred ADR in New York State, commissioned by New York Court
of Appeals Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, concluded that a critical need
exists for uniformity of standards and definitions for alternative dis-
pute resolution processes.53 The report specifically noted that “me-
diation” is a term used in an “extraordinary variety of ways.”54 To
address this problem, the report recommends the promulgation of





51. Some argue that the mediator should provide the neutral evaluation as a “last
step” when the evaluation represents the “sole opportunity for settlement.” Aaron, supra
note 10, at 62. Others who find evaluation consistent with the mediator’s role say evalua-
tions should be made only if parties are sufficiently sophisticated not to be unduly swayed
by the mediator’s opinion. See James J. Alfini, Moderator, Evaluative Versus Facilitative
Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919, 928 (1997) (quoting Florida lawyer-
mediator Lawrence M. Watson, Jr.). While a neutral evaluation can be critical in gener-
ating a settlement by expanding parties’ information bases and deflating unrealistic posi-
tions, the potential harms of a mediator evaluating outweigh the potential benefits. The
same result can be achieved by the mediator giving a party-requested evaluation only af-
ter notifying the parties that he or she is acting in a capacity other than that of a media-
tor. See discussion infra Part X.
52. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing the importance of well-
defined and uniform processes).
53. See CHIEF JUDGE’S N.Y. STATE COURT ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. PROJECT,
COURT-REFERRED ADR IN N.Y. STATE 7 (1996).
54. Id. at 7.
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statewide standards55 and the subscription of neutrals to a specific
code of ethics.56 In discussing the confusion of terms and labels, the
report notes that “[b]lurring the lines between mediation, neutral
evaluation and even arbitration can have deleterious conse-
quences.”57 The consequences include parties who do not know what
to expect and neutrals who do not understand what constitutes good
practice.58 Interestingly, the body of the report includes a discussion
of training standards that states: “mediators do not advise litigants
on the law or likely court outcomes . . . .”59
When attorneys advise clients about the advantages and disad-
vantages of mediation, when courts and institutions create media-
tion programs and panels of mediators, when consumers go to the
Yellow Pages to find a mediator, they should know what they are
getting. They should have a clear understanding of the goals of the
process and the tasks the neutral will perform.60
In an article criticizing ADR, Noreen Connell, former president of
the New York State chapter of the National Organization for
Women, describes a case in which a married couple elects to mediate
their divorce to avoid dissipating marital assets in litigation:
At the sessions, the mediator, who is a woman, echoes the hus-
band’s complaints that the wife is “too angry and too suspicious”
when he claims that he no longer has a pension and that he has
lost the credit card records. The wife is told her complaintss [sic]
about not getting enough money to pay the mortgage since her
husband moved out of the house are emotionally damaging to their
son and that responsible parents choose joint custody.61
Ms. Connell’s conclusion about mediation is contained in the article’s
title, “Beware of Alternative Dispute Resolution.” Another conclusion
based on the same story is that the mediator was so busy evaluating
who was right and wrong and what the outcome should be that the
mediator did not mediate at all . The mediation community must
make the meaning of mediation so clear that, in her next article, Ms.
Connell will criticize the mediator involved in this case, not the me-
diation process itself.
                                                                                                                   
55. See id. at 8.
56. See id. at 9.
57. Id. at 37.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 54 (emphasis added). Although the mediator does not advise parties on the
law and likely court outcomes, the report states that mediators “should be familiar with
the law, court rules and procedures pertaining to the subject area of the case they are me-
diating.” Id.
60. See Kovach & Love, supra note 10, at 32 (stating that the term “mediation”
should have uniform meaning from state to state and from one court to another).
61. Noreen Connell, Beware of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The “Touchy-Feely
Trap”, NOW-NYS ACTION REP., Summer 1996, at 7, 7.
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X.   MIXED PROCESSES CAN BE USEFUL, BUT CALL THEM WHAT THEY
ARE!
Parties sometimes request that neutrals assume a variety of
roles. “Mixed processes” abound: med-arb, arb-med,62 mini-trials,63
summary jury trials, and mediation and neutral evaluation.64 These
mixed processes can address particular needs of a situation and can
be very helpful.
Mediators are not foreclosed from engaging in some other process
or helping parties design a mixed process. Whatever the service be-
ing provided, however, it should be requested by the parties and ac-
curately labeled. When a process is “mixed” and the neutral has mul-
tiple roles, he or she is bound by more than one code of ethics and is
charged with separate goals and tasks. A properly labeled process—
or, conversely, a label that has a clear meaning—promotes integrity,
disputant satisfaction, and uniform practice.
Mediators who regularly give case assessments and expert opin-
ions should continue those practices only if they are requested by the
parties, properly advertised, and accurately labeled.
Driving out of Manhattan on the Henry Hudson Parkway, a major
route to New Jersey, a large billboard pictures David Letterman pro-
claiming: “Attention motorists: NJ is closed.” I can imagine David
Letterman with his huge smile announcing “Attention disputants:
YOUR MEDIATOR MAY EVALUATE.” It should seem equally ab-
surd.
                                                                                                                   
62. See Laurence Connor, How to Combine Facilitation with Evaluation, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 15, 15 (1996). Connor describes a two-phase process in
which, in the first phase, the neutral evaluates, makes an award, and seals the award. See
id. If the facilitation that follows does not result in settlement, the advisory award is
shown to the parties as a “reality check.” Id. Since the sealed award cannot be changed af-
ter facilitation begins, the parties can reveal sensitive matters and possible weaknesses to
the neutral without fearing the award will be affected. See id.
63. A mini-trial is a private dispute resolution process in which attorneys for each
party present their cases to the other side in an abbreviated format in a session chaired by
a neutral advisor. See Evans & Sloane, supra note 35, at 761. After the case presentations,
the parties attempt to negotiate a settlement, usually with the assistance of a neutral ad-
visor who facilitates the discussion or renders a nonbinding opinion. See id.
64. In the context of employment disputes, mediation and neutral fact-finding have
been successfully combined. See, e.g., Carol Wittenberg et al., Why Employment Disputes
Mediation Is on the Rise, LITIG. & TECH. MGMT. REP., Feb. 1996, at 8, 8.
